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Using an extensive new data set on corporate bond defaults in the U.S. from 1866 to 2010, we study
the macroeconomic effects of bond market crises and contrast them with those resulting from banking
crises. During the past 150 years, the U.S. has experienced many severe corporate default crises in
which 20 to 50 percent of all corporate bonds defaulted. Although the total par amount of corporate
bonds has often rivaled the amount of bank loans outstanding, we find that corporate default crises
have far fewer real effects than do banking crises. These results provide empirical support for current
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istrebulaev@stanford.eduIn this paper, we use an extensive new data set on corporate bond defaults in the U.S.
from 1866 to 2010 to study the macroeconomic eﬀects of major crises in the corporate
bond market. To provide additional perspective, we also contrast these eﬀects with
those resulting from banking crises.
Our motivation for doing this is threefold. First, while banking crises in the
U.S. have been the focus of many studies (important examples include Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ (2009) and Schularick and Taylor (2011)), relatively little attention has been
given to corporate bond market default crises (corporate default crises for short) in the
literature. The corporate bond market, however, has been a major source of credit in
the U.S. during the past 150 years, and the amount of outstanding corporate bonds has
often rivaled, or even exceeded, the amount of bank loans outstanding. We focus on
the U.S. since it has been the only country where privately owned corporations issued
public debt on a large scale until the latter part of the 20th Century. By studying this
important but underresearched market, we hope to broaden our understanding of the
role that credit plays in the macroeconomy.
Second, the corporate debt markets have experienced many major shocks during
the past 150 years. A number of these shocks were much more severe than even those
during the Great Depression. For example, more than 50 percent of all outstanding
bonds in the U.S. defaulted during the 1871–1879 period as many railroads found
themselves overextended in the wake of their rapid expansion during the post Civil-
War “technology” boom.1 Thus, corporate bond markets have suﬀered crises that may
be as severe as any experienced by the banking sector. Furthermore, Friedman and
Schwartz (1963) argue that large declines in the market value of banks’ portfolios of
corporate bonds were a major contributing factor to the widespread bank failures of
the Great Depression.2 Because of this, the historical experience of the corporate bond
market in the U.S. may be able to provide a new perspective on ﬁnancial crises.
Third, by contrasting the eﬀects of corporate default and banking crises on the
economy, we also hope to be able to shed new light on the mechanisms by which
ﬁnancial crises propagate economic ﬂuctuations. This is because the two primary
channels by which current theory suggests that banking crises accelerate economic
downturns are largely absent in corporate bond market crises. Thus, studying the
macroeconomic eﬀects of corporate default crises essentially provides us with an “out
1In contrast, the highest corporate default rate during the Great Depression was 6.73
percent in 1933. The highest business failure and mortgage foreclosure rates during
the Great Depression were 1.53 percent in 1932, and 2.39 percent in 1933, respectively
(rates based on series V27 and N301 of Historical Statistics of the United States:
Colonial Times to 1970).
2For a discussion of the evidence on this issue, see Calomiris and Mason (2003a).
1of sample” test of the role of these two channels.
More speciﬁcally, current theoretical models of banking crises emphasize the cen-
tral role of the credit and collateral channels. For example, Bernanke (1983) argues
that a major reason for the persistence of the Great Depression was the collapse of
the credit channel after a large fraction of U.S. banks failed. This collapse hit small
and medium sized ﬁrms particularly hard since they did not have the same access to
alternative forms of credit that a larger ﬁrm might (see the discussion by Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ (2009) in their comprehensive review of banking crises). This theme also
appears in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) who explicitly incorporate het-
erogeneity in ﬁrms’ abilities to borrow in the capital markets into their model of the
ﬁnancial accelerator.3 Another important literature focuses on the role of the collateral
channel in triggering economic downturns. For example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
show how an initial decline in asset values can reduce the ability of ﬁrms to borrow
since their collateral is impaired, which, in turn, can lead to further rounds of declines
in asset values. Similarly, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) study a model in which shocks
aﬀect the value of a ﬁrm’s collateral, forcing them to turn to more expensive external
credit channels.
In contrast, neither the credit nor collateral channels are likely to play much
of a role in a corporate bond market crisis. In particular, only larger ﬁrms would
be initially aﬀected by a corporate default crisis since they are the only ﬁrms that
participate in this capital market. Among the many reasons why this is the case are
the ﬁxed costs of issuance as well as the disclosurecosts which make only issues of large
size economically viable. These larger ﬁrms, however, might be able to ﬁnd alternative
sources of credit in a crisis, thereby cushioning the output eﬀects of the initial shock.
Furthermore, the vast majority of corporate bonds issued in the U.S. are in the form
of unsecured debentures rather than mortgage or equipment-secured bonds.4 Thus,
large ﬁrms that issue bonds in the capital markets are able to borrow against their
future income streams, rather than being limited to their current collateral. Because
collateral plays a much smaller role in the corporate bond market, the ability of the
collateral channel to function as an accelerator in a corporate default crisis is limited,
thereby dampening the potential eﬀects on the macroeconomy.
For these reasons, an examination of the macroeconomic eﬀects of a corporate
default crisis could provide useful insights about the importance of the credit and
3Also see Calomiris (1993) who discusses the evidence showing that larger manufac-
turing ﬁrms had greater access to credit during the Great Depression than smaller
ﬁrms.
4This is also true during the earlier part of the study period. For example, Hickman
(1953) estimates that the fraction of corporate bonds issued in the U.S. prior to 1945
that were secured by claims against assets such as equipment was on the order of two
to three percent.
2collateral channels. For example, ﬁnding that the real eﬀects of a corporate default
crisis were just as severe as those of a banking crisis would argue against these two
channels playing a central role in accelerating economic downturns. On the other
hand, ﬁnding that corporate default crises have only relatively minor macroeconomic
eﬀects would provide corroborative evidence that the credit and collateral channels
are the prime suspects for explaining why banking crises are particularly damaging.
We begin by showing that corporate default and banking crises are separate and
distinct phenomena. In particular, there is very little correlation between the timing
of corporate default and banking crises.
Next, we conﬁrm that there are in fact signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the roles that
the credit and collateral channels play in the two types of crises. Not surprisingly,
we ﬁnd that bank lending growth declines after a banking crises and, similarly, that
corporate bond market growth declines after a corporate default crisis. Interestingly,
however, we ﬁnd that bank lending increases signiﬁcantly shortly after a corporate
default crisis. In contrast, the opposite is not true after a banking crisis. Thus, these
results strongly suggest that large corporate bond issuers are able to substitute sources
of credit after a corporate default crisis, thereby mitigating the impact of the credit
channel mechanism. This ﬁnding is consistent with Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)
who ﬁnd that large corporate borrowers increased their bank borrowing signiﬁcantly
in the wake of the 2008 Lehman crisis in the capital markets by drawing on their
existing banking lines of credit. These results are also consistent with Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2007), and many others who argue
that large ﬁrms have greater access to capital during a crisis than do small ﬁrms.
In an important and closely-related paper, Schularick and Taylor (2011) demonstrate
that bank loan growth has predictive power in explaining future banking crises. Our
results complement theirs by showing that a corporate default crisis can lead to an
increase in bank lending.
Focusing next on the collateral channel, we explore the implications of Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) by examining whether negative shocks in the values of major classes
of collateral map into subsequent contractions in lending. We ﬁnd that declines in
housing and stock market values both result in signiﬁcant declines in subsequent bank
lending. In contrast, negative shocks in housing and stock market values have no
apparent eﬀect on the subsequent amount of corporate bond issuance. Since bank
lending is typically collateralized while corporate bond issuance is not, these results
support the Kiyotaki and Moore argument that the link between collateral values and
credit availability is central to understanding the macroeconomic impact of banking
crises.
Finally, using a vector-autoregression (VAR) framework, we compare the real and
ﬁnancial eﬀects of banking and corporate default crises on GDP growth, industrialpro-
duction, and inﬂation. We ﬁnd that corporate default crises do not have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on output, measured either by GDP or by industrial production. In contrast,
3banking crises have longlasting eﬀects on both GDP growth and industrial produc-
tion. Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009), and others show
that banking crises tend to be followed by periods of lower inﬂation or even deﬂation.
We extend this literature by showing that the same is also true following corporate
default crises. These results are important since they highlight the unique role played
by banks. In particular, banking crises are followed by both real and monetary eﬀects
while other types of ﬁnancial crises are followed only by monetary eﬀects.
Taken together, these results providestrongsupportfor the implicationsof current
theoretical models about the macroeconomic eﬀects of banking crises. In particular,
these models implythat corporate default crises should have less severe macroeconomic
consequences since the credit and collateral mechanisms are largely absent in default
crises. As support for this latter point, we show that corporate borrowers are more
able to substitute sources of credit after a crisis, and that negative shocks to asset or
collateral values have little or no eﬀect on the amount of corporate bond indebtedness.
Consistent with theory, we conﬁrm that banking crises have more severe eﬀects on the
macroeconomy than do default crises.
I. The Data
Although banking crises in the U.S. have been the focus of many studies, relatively
little attention has been given to corporate default crises in the literature. The primary
reason for this may simply be that historical data on corporate default crises have not
been as readily available to researchers.
Corporate bond markets, however, have historically played almost as important
a role in providing capital in the U.S. as the banking sector. To illustrate this, Figure
1 plots the total amount of corporate bonds outstanding during the 1900–2010 period
alongside the total amount of bank loans in the U.S. (as reported by Schularick and
Taylor (2011)), where both series are normalized by GDP. The sources for all the data
used in the paper are described in the Appendix.
As shown, the size of the corporate bond market has rivaled the total amount of
bank loans throughout much of the sample period. The ratio of bank loans to GDP
averages 33.2 percent during the study period, while the same measure is 19.2 percent
for corporate bonds. During the 1933–1940 period, corporate bonds actually repre-
sented a larger fraction of GDP than did bank loans. After World War II, however,
bank lending grew more rapidly than corporate bonds, and is currently about twice
as large a fraction of GDP.
The role of the corporate bond market in raising capital has evolved signiﬁcantly
during the past 150 years. To illustrate this, Table 1 provides some summary infor-
mation about the number of bond issuers listed in the historical record by industry
4or sector. Since the deﬁnitions of the categories shown in Table 1 have changed over
time in the historical sources, care should be taken in interpreting the growth rates of
individual categories.
During the 1866–1890 period, corporate bonds were issued primarily to ﬁnance
the rapid growth of the capital-intensive railroad and canal industries. Even during
this early period, however, the bond markets were used to provide funding for new
technology. For example, Western Union Telegraph bonds appear as early as 1867,
and American Bell Telephone bonds appear in 1890. Beginning in the 1890s, electric,
gas, street railways, and water utilities began to raise signiﬁcant amounts of capital
through the corporate bond market.
By the early 1900s, it became increasingly common for broader classes of indus-
trial ﬁrms such as oil, coal, steel, natural resource, and manufacturing ﬁrms to issue
public debt as well. Familiar names that appear in the historical record include Proc-
tor and Gamble in 1891, General Electric in 1894, American Telephone and Telegraph
in 1901, and U.S. Steel in 1902.
During the Great Depression, the corporate bond market also became a major
source of capital for ﬁnancing large real estate projects such as hotels and oﬃce build-
ings as bank ﬁnancing became less available. For example, bond issues for the Chrysler
Building, the Waldorf Astoria, and the Schubert Theater in New York appear in the
1933 Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Interestingly, it was not until the 1970s
that banks and other ﬁnancial ﬁrms began to raise signiﬁcant amount of funds in the
corporate bond markets.5
In this paper, we make use of an extensive data set that we have recently con-
structed to study the eﬀects of major crises in the corporate bond markets on the
macroeconomy (see Giesecke, Longstaﬀ, Schaefer, and Strebulaev (2011)). Speciﬁ-
cally, the data set includes the annual percentage default rates for all U.S. nonﬁnan-
cial corporate bonds during the 1866–2010 period along with estimates of the annual
growth rates in the corporate bond market for much of this period. The data set is
composed of both handcollected data extracted from historical ﬁnancial records such
as the Commercial and Financial Chronicle as well as tabulated data from a variety of
sources including Hickman (1953, 1958, 1960), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Atkin-
son (1967), Homer and Sylla (1991), and Moody’s Investors Service (2011). Note
that while industry sources provide data on corporate default rates dating back to
1970 (and some limited data back to 1920), our data set extends the historical record
on corporate defaults by nearly a century. Furthermore, our default rates are value-
weighted because they are based on the outstanding par amount of corporate bonds
that default each year. Thus, our value-weighted average default rates diﬀer from the
default rates provided by industry sources which are typically issuer weighted. This
5See Giesecke, Longstaﬀ, Schaefer, and Strebulaev(2011) for a discussion of the history
of the U.S. corporate bond market.
5distinction is important since smaller ﬁrms are more likely to default, potentially in-
ﬂating issuer-weighted default rates.6 The advantage of value-weighted default rates
is that it reﬂects the loss rates of a representative bond investor.
Figure 2 plots the annual U.S. corporate bond default rate from 1866 to 2010.
There are clearly many years in which the U.S. capital markets suﬀered heavy losses as
the result of widespread corporate bond defaults. The maximum default rate during
the study period is 16.25 percent. The average default rate is 1.52 percent and the
median default rate is 0.55 percent.
It is interesting to observe that there are a number of ﬁrms that have defaulted
more than once during the sample period. For example, the worst “repeat oﬀender”
in the sample is the Seaboard Air Line Railway which either defaulted or underwent a
corporate reorganization six times during the study period in 1905, 1908, 1921, 1928,
1939, and 1944. Another example is the Chicago, Peoria, and St. Louis Railway
that defaulted a total of ﬁve times in 1893, 1898, 1906, 1914, and 1919. These ex-
amples illustrate that, as is often the case in sovereign debt markets, corporate debt
issuers are frequently able to return quickly to the capital markets after a default or
reorganization.
To contrast the eﬀects of corporate default crises with those of banking crises,
we use a variety of sources to identify banking crises in the U.S. during the 1870 to
2008 period. These sources identify the following years as U.S. banking crises: 1873,
1884, 1893, 1907, 1930–1933, 1984–1991, and 2007–2008. Table A1 in the Appendix
lists the sources for these dates. Following Schularick and Taylor (2011), we construct
an indicator variable that takes value one for banking crisis years, and zero otherwise.
Finally, the other macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables used in the study are also
described in the appendix.
II. Corporate Default Crises
As a working deﬁnition of a corporate bond market crisis, we characterize a crisis as a
set of consecutive years during which the default rate is in excess of 2.5 percent, which
is roughly ﬁve times the median default rate. While there are many other possible
ways of deﬁning corporate default crises, this approach at least has the virtue of
simplicity. We note that the results are very robust to how a default crisis is deﬁned.7
6That smaller ﬁrms are more likely to default follows from the evidence that issuer-
weighted default rates tend to be much higher than value-weighted default rates. See
the discussion in Giesecke, Longstaﬀ, Schaefer, and Strebulaev (2011).
7For example, we also use alternative thresholds of corporate default crises in which
the default rates are in excess of 1.5 percent, in excess of 2.0 percent, etc. The results
6Furthermore, the results are very similar when we simply use the annual default rate
in the analysis rather than using an indicator variable to identify speciﬁc crisis periods.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the 13 corporate default crises identiﬁed
during the study period. As shown, there have been extended crises in which corporate
capital markets were battered by severe levels of default. For example, more than 50
percent of all outstanding bonds in the U.S. defaulted during the 1871–1879 period as
many railroads found themselves overextended in the wake of their rapid expansion
during the post Civil-War era. The second most-severe crisis during the 1891–1896
period resulted in more than 25 percent of all bonds defaulting. Surprisingly, the
corporate default crisis during the Great Depression was only the third most-severe
crisis in terms of total defaults, and only the sixth most-severecrisis in terms of average
default rate.
Table 2 also shows that the average length of a corporate default crisis is 2.69
years, and the median length is 2.00 years. This contrasts starkly with the average
length of 1.48 years for the 31 NBER-deﬁned business downturnsduring the 1865–2010
period. Thus, while default crises are less frequent than business downturns, they are
almost twice as persistent.
On the other hand, corporate default crises appear to occur more frequently than
banking crises. Schularick and Taylor (2011) (as well as the other sources listed in
Table A1 of the Appendix) identify seven diﬀerent banking crises in the U.S. during
the 1870–2008 period. In total, these banking crises cover about 13 percent of the
1870–2008 period. This is roughly consistent with Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) who
argue that the U.S. has spent 18 percent of the time from 1800 to 2008 in a banking
crisis. In contrast, our deﬁnition implies that the U.S. spent about 24 percent of the
time from 1866 to 2010 in a corporate default crisis.
To provide some sense for the relation between the diﬀerent types of crisis periods,
we compute the correlation of indicator variables that take value one during a corpo-
rate default crisis and one during a banking crisis, respectively, and zero otherwise.
The correlation between the corporate default indicator and the banking indicator is
only 0.04. This low correlation suggests that a corporate default crisis is a distinct
phenomenon from a banking crisis. As one has to be cautious about interpreting sim-
ple correlations, however, we will proceed with a more in-depth analysis of the data
in subsequent sections.
Although not shown, we also investigate whether there is a signiﬁcant lead/lag
relation between corporate default and banking crises. In essence, we test for potential
contagion eﬀects. The results indicate, however, that there is little or no lead/lag
relation between the two types of crises.
are very similar to those we report.
7III. Credit Substitution
As discussed, one possible explanation for why banking crises might lead to more se-
vere consequences for the macroeconomy than corporate default crises could be the
credit channel mechanism. In particular, shocks to the banking sector may accelerate
economic downturns as small and midsized bank borrowers face restricted access to
credit. On the other hand, large corporate bond issuers might be able to ﬁnd alter-
native sources of credit after a shock to the capital markets. Thus, diﬀerences in the
macroeconomic eﬀects of the two types of crises might be attributable to heterogeneity
in the ability of ﬁrms to substitute sources of credit.
To explore this issue, we use a VAR framework to look for evidence of credit
substitution after corporate default and banking crises. Speciﬁcally, we examine the
eﬀects of crises on subsequent growth in the amount of bank loans and corporate
bonds outstanding. The results from the analysis are reported in Table 3. Note that
while each VAR is estimated as a three-equation speciﬁcation, only the results for
the equation with the indicated dependent variable are reported for each of the VAR
speciﬁcations. Similarly, for the other VAR speciﬁcations reported in the paper.
Not surprisingly, the results show that when a banking crisis occurs, the growth
rate of bank loans declines signiﬁcantly the next year. Similarly, a corporate bond
market crisis results in a signiﬁcant decline in the growth rate of the corporate bond
market the subsequent year. A number of economic mechanisms can be put forward
to explain such a relationship. For example, a negative shock to asset values increases
the propensity of corporate bond crises, and at the same time drives ﬁrms further
away from reﬁnancing, resulting in a lower growth rate of the bond market (Strebulaev
(2007)). In any case, these results illustratethat ﬁnancialcrises aretypically associated
with credit contractions.
Turning to the issue of credit substitution, the results illustrate that there is
an important asymmetry between the two types of crises. In particular, a corporate
default crisis results in a signiﬁcant increase in the growth rate of bank loans in the
second subsequent year. In fact, the growth in bank loans in the second year more than
oﬀsets the decline in bonds. This result is consistent with a scenario in which large
ﬁrms are able to turn to bank lending as an alternative source of credit after a crisis in
the corporate bond market. This result also parallels Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)
who show that while most types of bank lending declined during the recent ﬁnancial
crisis, there was a signiﬁcant increase in the amount of commercial and industrial
loans provided to large corporate borrowers in the wake of the Lehman default crisis.
They show that this increase in commercial and industrial lending was due largely
to large corporations drawing on their existing banking lines of credit as the capital
markets seized up after the defaults/reorganizations of Lehman, AIG, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, etc. In contrast, there is no evidence of credit substitution eﬀects after
8a banking crisis. In summary, the results support the view that the credit channel
mechanism described by Bernanke (1983) may be present in banking crises, but not
in default crises.
IV. The Role of Collateral
The earlier discussion suggested that collateral may play a much smaller role in the
corporate bond market than it does in the banking sector. To explore this possibility,
we estimate VAR speciﬁcations in which we examine the eﬀects on lending activity
of shocks in two important asset classes: housing and the stock market. There are
several reasons for focusing on these two asset classes. For example, real estate and
securities have often been used as collateral in secured lending transactions. In addi-
tion, historical data is available for stock returns and housing values for most of our
study period. While there are other types of assets that may be used as collateral
in bank lending, we note that these two asset classes together represent a major por-
tion of the total amount of assets in the economy.8 The stock returns are based on
the CRSP value-weighted index while the housing returns are based on the nominal
housing index reported in Shiller (2005). The results are reported in Table 4.
As shown, there is a highly signiﬁcant relation between the growth rate of bank
lending and the stock market return during the previous year. In particular, negative
stock market returns are associated with a decline in bank lending during the subse-
quent year. The t statistic for the lagged stock market return is in excess of seven.
Similarly, there is a signiﬁcant (at the ten percent level) relation between changes in
housing values and the growth rate of banking lending the next year. The positive sign
of the coeﬃcient implies that declines in housing values map into lower subsequent
availability in bank credit or a reduction in demand. These results are consistent with
standard collateral-based macroeconomic models such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
which imply that bank lending may decrease precipitously in the wake of a major
declines in collateral values.9
In contrast, Table 4 shows that there is no relation between stock market and
8To illustrate the importance of these two asset classes, we observe that the value of
household real estate represented 21.66, 26.76, and 22.74 percent of total household
wealth in the years 1950, 1980, and 2010, respectively (based on Federal Reserve Board
Flow of Funds Data (Release Z.1)). Similarly, the value of corporate equity and mutual
fund holdings represented 11.85, 8.71, and 18.21 percent of total household wealth in
the same three years, respectively.
9Note also that Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) illustrate the collateral channel mechanism
using the example of real estate values.
9housing returns and the subsequent growth rate in corporate bonds outstanding. This
result, of course, is not all that surprising given that the vast majority of corporate
bonds are issued on an uncollateralized basis. Thus, corporations are typically able
to obtain credit on the basis of their future cash ﬂows rather than being limited to
their current asset holdings. Nevertheless, conﬁrming that there is little link between
corporate debt issuance and the values of major asset classes is important since it
allows us to attribute diﬀerences in the macroeconomic eﬀects of banking and default
crises more directly to the role of the collateral channel. In summary, the results lend
support to the view that the collateral channel may play a much larger and direct role
in banking crises.
V. Macroeconomic Eﬀects
We now turn to the central issue of whether there is a diﬀerence in the nature of
the macroeconomic eﬀects resulting from banking and corporate default crises. In
examining this issue, our approach will again be to use a VAR framework. Speciﬁcally,
we estimate VAR speciﬁcations in which both the corporate default crisis and banking
crisis indicator variables are used to forecast macroeconomic variables. By including
the corporate default crisis indicator, we can examine the eﬀects of a major disruption
in the corporate debt markets. By including the banking crisis indicator, we can also
contrast the eﬀects of the two types of crises.
To study the macroeconomic eﬀects resulting from a crisis, we focus on three
variables for which data are available from 1870: the annual growth rate in per capita
real GDP, the annual growth rate in industrial production, and the annual inﬂation
rate. Table 5 reports the results from the VAR speciﬁcation using three lagged values
of the variables.
The VAR results indicate that corporate default crises do not have any signiﬁcant
eﬀects on output. In particular, the lagged values of the capital market crisis do not
forecast subsequent changes in GDP or industrial production. Thus, corporate default
crises do not appear to have real eﬀects on the economy. These results are consistent
with the implications of the banking crisis literature discussed earlier.
In sharp contrast, banking crises have signiﬁcant predictive power for both sub-
sequent GDP and industrial production growth rates. In particular, the coeﬃcient
for the ﬁrst lagged banking crisis indicator is signiﬁcant in both the GDP and indus-
trial production VARs. Furthermore, these signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are both negative
in sign, indicating that banking crises are followed by declines in real output. This
latter result is also consistent with the extensive literature documenting that banking
crises have large negative eﬀects on the macroeconomy.
As an alternative way of illustrating these results, Figures 3 and 4 plot the impulse
10response functions for the response of GDP growth and industrial production to the
corporate default and banking crisis indicator variables, respectively. As shown, a
corporate default crisis has little or no cumulative eﬀect on either GDP growth or
industrial production growth. In contrast, a banking crisis has a signiﬁcant immediate
eﬀect on both of these measures.
The third macroeconomic variable is the annual inﬂation rate. We again estimate
a VAR with three lagged values of the crisis variables and report the results in Table
5 and plot the impulse response functions in Figure 5. As shown, the ﬁrst lagged
value of both the capital market and banking crisis indicators are signiﬁcant and the
coeﬃcients are roughly comparable in terms of their magnitude. In addition, both of
these signiﬁcant values are negative in sign, indicating that the two types of crises tend
to be followed by a decline in the inﬂation rate. These results complement previous
research on the monetary eﬀects of banking crises such as Garcia-Herrero (1997),
Calomiris and Mason (2003b), Kaehler (2010), Qian, Reinhart, and Rogoﬀ (2011),
and others.
VI. Discussion
Bank debt is a major constituent of private debt contracts, while corporate bonds are
major examples of public debt contracts. As such, they diﬀer along a number of im-
portant dimensions that can help articulate the economic mechanisms that determine
why these types of debt and their associated crises have diﬀerent macroeconomic real
eﬀects.
First, bank debt has covenants that are both more numerous and tighter than
corporate bonds.10 Long-term corporate bonds have mainly negative covenants (i.e.,
covenants preventing ﬁrms from engaging in certain types of activities), while short-
term corporate debt (such as commercial paper) has very few covenants at all. At the
same time, bank (and nonbank private) debt typically also has aﬃrmative covenants
(requiring ﬁrms to maintain certain ﬁnancial metrics such as new worth or interest
coverage ratio covenants) in addition to negative covenants. The macroeconomic im-
plication is that a relatively small decrease in asset and collateral values is suﬃcient
for ﬁrms to violate bank covenants and enter default or renegotiate their obligations,
while a large decline in asset values is needed for ﬁrms to default on corporate bonds.
Second, bank debt is typically of short-term maturity while corporate bonds typ-
ically of long-term maturity. For example, James (1987) reports that the average
maturity of U.S. nonﬁnancial bank debt is 5.6 years, while the average maturity of
10For example, see Kahan and Tuckman (1995) who compare covenants of privately
placed debt and public bonds.
11publicly listed debt (mostly corporate bonds) is 18 years at issuance. Moreover, a
large fraction of bank debt is in the form of short-term (less than one year) credit
lines. In the earlier part of our sample, it is likely that the maturity of corporate
bonds is even larger as they were issued mostly to ﬁnance long-duration enterprises
such as railroads. In terms of macroeconomic implications, at the time of the crises
when a large fraction of bank debt is needed to be reﬁnanced, liquidity becomes an
all-important issue. This might lead to snowball eﬀects. As public debt has longer
maturity, liquidity issues are much less important.
Third, bank debt is typically collateralized, while public debt is not. Furthermore,
bank debt is typically senior to public debt if ﬁrms have both bank debt and public
debt outstanding. Clearly, this means that a decline in collateral values has a larger
impact on ﬁrms that have bank debt outstanding than those with public debt.
These three features need to be considered together. Small ﬁrms, which predomi-
nantly have access to bank debt, face shorter maturities, tighter covenants, and pledge
higher collateral than their large counterparts. Thus, they are more likely to be af-
fected by the collateral and related channels, and large ﬁrms less eﬀected. This may
have important implications for macro policy although it is important to take into ac-
count the advantages of bank debt for small ﬁrms in terms of long-term relationships
and monitoring.
VII. Conclusion
Even though the size of the corporate bond market over the past 150 years is on
the same order of magnitude as the bank lending market, we ﬁnd that banking crises
have much graver implications for the macroeconomy than do corporate default crises.
Banking crises are followed by decreased output and lower inﬂation rates. Corporate
bond market crises, however, appear to have little or no eﬀect on GDP and industrial
output.
These results provide a new perspective on the importance of the banking credit
channel in the propagation of economic downturns. Current theory suggests that
the reason why banking crises have such large real eﬀects is that small and medium
borrowers become credit constrained during a crisis. The ﬂip side of this argument
is that a crisis in a credit market that is only accessed by large borrowers should
have much smaller eﬀects. Not only do we ﬁnd that the macroeconomic eﬀects of a
corporate default crisis are much less severe, we also ﬁnd evidence consistent with a
scenario in which large borrowers are able to tap the bank lending market when the
corporate capital market is experiencing severe distress. Clearly, however, it would be
desirable to have additional direct evidence that the diﬀerences in results are due to
the relative sizes of borrowers in the banking and corporate bond markets.
12Similarly, these results also provide support for the importance of the collateral
channel in banking crisis. This is because collateral plays a much smaller role in
corporate bond markets than in the banking sector. Thus, another reason why banking
crises have much larger eﬀects on the macroeconomy than default crises may simply
be that the shocks to the value of collateral may restrict the access of bank borrowers
to obtain credit, but not the ability of large ﬁrms to issue corporate bonds.
13Appendix
This appendix brieﬂy describes the variables used in the paper along with the source
of the data. In addition, Table A1 lists the sources for the dates identiﬁed as banking
crisis years.
Corporate Bond Default Rates. The value-weighted U.S. nonﬁnancial corporate
bond default rates from 1866 to 2010 are in an online appendix. The data sources, de-
fault deﬁnitions, and empirical approach used to construct the time series of corporate
bond default rates are documented in detail in the appendix of Giesecke, Longstaﬀ,
Schaefer, and Strebulaev (2011).
Corporate Bond Market Crisis Dates. These dates are given in Table 2 of the
paper.
Bank Crisis Dates. The dates of banking crises are taken from a variety of sources
that are summarized in Table A1 of this appendix.
Corporate Bond Market Growth Rates. Annual growth rates in the notional size
of the U.S. corporate bond market are based on three sources. The size of the corporate
bond market from 1900–1944 is given in Table A-6 of Hickman (1953) (straight bonds,
large issues only). The size of the corporate bond market from 1945–1965 is given in
Table 21 of Atkinson (1967). The size of the corporate bond market from 1970–2008
is based on total amount of nonﬁnancial corporate bonds reported as line 2 of Table
L.212 of the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States reported by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve Systems (Release Z.1). Values for missing dates are
linearly interpolated from available data for the closest matching dates.
Bank Loan Growth Rates. Annual bank loan growth rates are based on the bank
loan data provided in the online data appendix to Schularick and Taylor (2011).
Stock Market Returns. The annual stock market return time series is given by
ﬁrst using the monthly stock return data for 1802–1929 provided by Schwert (1990)
to compute annual returns for this period, and then using the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) annual value-weighted stock market return index for the
subsequent period.
Housing Values. Percentage changes in housing values for 1890–2008 are based on
the nominal home price index data given in Figure 2.1 of Shiller (2005) (updated data
available on Robert Shiller’s website http://www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data.htm).
GDP Growth Rate. Annual GDP growth rates are based on the real GDP estimates
for the U.S. for 1870–2008 provided in the online data appendix to Schularick and
Taylor (2011).
Industrial Production Growth Rate. Annual industrial production growth rates
are based on data from three sources. Industrial production data for the 1865–1915
14period are given in Davis (2004). For the 1916–1920 period, we use the total physical
production data provided by the NBER as macroeconomic series a01008a. Data for
the 1921–2008 period are obtained from the Federal Reserve Board, series G17.
Inﬂation. Annual inﬂation rates for 1871–2008 are based on the CPI data given
in Chapter 26 of Shiller (2005) (updated data available on Robert Shiller’s website
http://www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data.htm).
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Dates of U.S. Banking Crises. This table lists the dates of U.S. banking crises. Also
listed are the key references documenting these dates.
Years References
1873 Benmelech and Bordo (2011)
Schularick and Taylor (2011)
Wicker (2000)
Tallman and Wicker (2010)
1884 Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria (2001)
Schularick and Taylor (2011)
1893 Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria (2001)
Schularick and Taylor (2011)
1907 Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria (2001)
Schularick and Taylor (2011)
1930–1933 Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria (2001)
Schularick and Taylor (2011)
1984–1991 Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008)
Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Schularick and Taylor (2011)
2007–2008 Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Schularick and Taylor (2011)References
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Figure 1. Outstanding Bank Loans and Corporate Bonds as a Fraction of GDP..
This graph plots the ratio of total outstanding bank loans to GDP and the ratio of total






















Figure 2. Corporate Bond Default Rates from 1866 to 2010. This graph plots the
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Figure 3. GDP Growth Impulse Response Functions. The left graph plots the
impulse response function from a banking crisis. The right graph plots the impulse response
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Response of IP to CAPITAL
Figure 4. Industrial Production Growth Impulse Response Functions. The left
graph plots the impulse response function from a banking crisis. The right graph plots the
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Figure 5. Inﬂation Rate Impulse Response Functions. The left graph plots the
impulse response function from a banking crisis. The right graph plots the impulse response
function from a corporate default crisis.Table 1
Corporate Bond Issuers. This table lists the total number of U.S. nonﬁnancial corporate bond issuers
in the historical records by industry category for the dates shown. The source data is obtained from The
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Hickman (1953, 1958, 1960), Atkinson (1967), and Moody’s Investor
Services, Inc. and are described in the appendix. Because the data are obtained from diﬀerent historical
sources, the deﬁnitions of the respective categories may not be fully comparable over time.
Year Railroad Canal Real Estate Industrial Utility Transport Total
1870 147 14 5 1 167
1880 339 12 11 1 363
1890 369 4 26 3 402
1900 344 193 276 813
1910 331 134 552 1017
1920 306 206 659 1171
1930 574 111 491 930 2106
1940 519 231 680 976 2406
1950 335 137 219 366 1057
1960 121 169 73 363
1970 297 229 89 615
1980 592 285 108 985
1990 1596 337 142 2075
2000 2059 528 126 2713
2010 2520 603 104 3227Table 2
Corporate Default Crises. This table lists the dates for the corporate bond market default crises during the 1866–2010 sample period where a
crisis is identiﬁed as a contiguous period during which annual default rates generally exceed 2.5 percent. The annual default rates are the annual
percentage default rates of U.S. nonﬁnancial corporate bonds for the 1866–2010 period. Average default rate denotes the average annual default rate
during the corporate default crisis. Total default rate denotes the sum of the annual default rates during the corporate default crisis. The length of
crises is measured in years. Default rates are expressed as percentages.
Date of Length Average Total Historical
Crisis of Crisis Default Rate Default Rate Background
1866 12 . 5 42 . 5 4Post Civil War adjustment
1869 17 . 1 37 . 1 3Linking of coasts by railroad
1871–1879 9 6.49 58.43 Railroad boom and crash
1883–1885 3 5.36 16.06 Bank panic of 1884
1887–1889 32 . 5 77 . 7 1Railroad boom and crash
1891–1896 6 4.93 29.95 Bank panic of 1893
1898 13 . 7 33 . 7 3Spanish-American War
1904 12 . 9 72 . 9 7Roosevelt, Panama Canal
1914–1915 24 . 1 98 . 3 9First World War
1932–1935 4 4.03 16.13 Great Depression
1938–1939 22 . 6 75 . 3 4Great Depression
2002 13 . 0 73 . 0 7Dot-com crisis
2009 12 . 6 02 . 6 0Global Financial Crisis
Average 2.69 4.68 12.59Table 3
VAR Estimation of the Credit Eﬀects of Corporate Default and Banking Crises. This table
reports results from the estimation of the indicated VAR speciﬁcation. Although each VAR speciﬁcation
includes three equations, only the results for the indicated equations are reported in the table. Thus,
each column reports the results from a separate VAR speciﬁcation. Loan growth rate denotes the annual
percentage change in the amount of bank loans. Bond growth rate denotes the annual percentage change in
the par amount of corporate bonds outstanding. Bond is an indicator variable that takes value one during
a corporate default crisis, and zero otherwise. Bank is an indicator variable that takes value one during a
banking crisis, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under each VAR coeﬃcient.
The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗,a n d∗ denote signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and ten percent levels, respectively.
VAR Speciﬁcation VAR 1 VAR 2
Dependent Variable Y: Loan Growth Rate Bond Growth Rate
Y t−1 0.48271∗∗∗ 0.14312
(0.1107) (0.1040)
Y t−2 −0.00070 0.04533
(0.1165) (0.0964)
Y t−3 0.24941 0.25774∗∗∗
(0.1071) (0.0918)
Bond t−1 −0.00793 −0.03756∗∗
(0.0243) (0.0169)
Bond t−2 0.05389∗∗ −0.00765
(0.0255) (0.0185)
Bond t−3 −0.01826 −0.02232
(0.0247) (0.0181)
Bank t−1 −0.07652∗∗∗ 0.01555
(0.0228) (0.0173)
Bank t−2 0.00309 0.00266
(0.0299) (0.0219)
Bank t−3 0.03375 −0.01090
(0.0263) (0.0192)
Adj. R2 0.4104 0.2737
N 100 100Table 4
VAR Estimation of the Credit Eﬀects of Shocks in Collateral Values. This table reports results
from the estimation of the indicated VAR speciﬁcation. Although each VAR speciﬁcation includes three
equations, only the results for the indicated equations are reported in the table. Thus, each column reports
the results from a separate VAR speciﬁcation. Loan growth rate denotes the annual percentage change in
the amount of bank loans. Bond growth rate denotes the annual percentage change in the par amount
of corporate bonds outstanding. Rm denotes the annual return on the CRSP value-weighted stock index.
Housing denotes the annual percentage change in the Shiller (2005) nominal Standard errors are reported in
parentheses under each VAR coeﬃcient. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗,a n d∗ denote signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve,
and ten percent levels, respectively.
VAR Speciﬁcation VAR 1 VAR 2
Dependent Variable Y: Loan Growth Rate Bond Growth Rate
Y t−1 0.56029∗∗∗ 0.25481∗∗
(0.1090) (0.1045)
Y t−2 −0.01239 0.09667
(0.1158) (0.0987)
Y t−3 0.11499 0.22106
(0.0917) (0.0964)
Rm t−1 0.17797∗∗∗ 0.03045
(0.0249) (0.0229)
Rm t−2 0.00528 −0.01966
(0.0306) (0.0227)
Rm t−3 −0.03312 0.04253
(0.0305) (0.0233)
Housing t−1 0.17426∗ 0.02257
(0.0962) (0.0870)
Housing t−2 0.00576 0.06848
(0.0971) (0.0877)
Housing t−3 0.01424 0.05412
(0.0893) (0.0789)
Adj. R2 0.5836 0.2387
N 100 100Table 5
VAR Estimation of the Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Corporate Default and Banking Crises. This
table reports results from the estimation of the indicated VAR speciﬁcation. Although each VAR speciﬁcation
includes three equations, only the results from the indicated equations are reported in the table. Thus, each
column reports the results from a separate VAR speciﬁcation. Bond is an indicator variable that takes value
one during a corporate default crisis, and zero otherwise. Bank is an indicator variable that takes value
one during a banking crisis, and zero otherwise. GDP denotes the annual percentage change in real GDP.
Industrial production denotes the annual percentage change in industrial production. Inﬂation denotes the
annual percentage change in the consumer price level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under
each VAR coeﬃcient. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗,a n d∗ denote signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and ten percent
levels, respectively.
VAR Speciﬁcation VAR 1 VAR 2 VAR 3
Industrial
Dependent Variable: Y GDP Production Inﬂation
Y t−1 0.25266∗∗∗ −0.00076 0.19790∗∗
(0.0938) (0.0889) (0.0930)
Y t−2 0.06082 −0.15844∗ 0.02440
(0.0952) (0.0871) (0.0951)
Y t−3 −0.10688 0.05884 0.04196
(0.0877) (0.0853) (0.0917)
Bond t−1 0.01722 0.03405 −0.03971∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0248) (0.0158)
Bond t−2 0.00022 −0.01543 0.00034
(0.0155) (0.0272) (0.0170)
Bond t−3 0.00399 0.03755 −0.00048
(0.0141) (0.0250) (0.0156)
Bank t−1 −0.05157∗∗∗ −0.10459∗∗∗ −0.04657∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0295) (0.0193)
Bank t−2 0.04200∗∗ 0.05406 0.00506
(0.0189) (0.0340) (0.0213)
Bank t−3 −0.00548 0.03752 0.02730
(0.0178) (0.0315) (0.0192)
Adj. R2 0.1228 0.1187 0.1578
N 138 138 137